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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

23 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

National Intelligence Officer for Warning


FROM:

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National Intelligence Officer for NESA

**SUBJECT:** 

Monthly Warning Meeting - March 1982



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In the more gene	Γαι
sense, analysts judge that a temporary Soviet incursion of significan size remains possible, and that it could occur with little advance size remains possible. The property already in place. The	
size remains possible, and that it could occur with itself additional to the notification, given Soviet force enhancements already in place. The notification, given Soviet possessarily related to this judgment.	25X1
increased air activity is not necessarily related	
4. <u>Libya - Reaction to US Sanctions</u> . Little change in Libyan a	ctivity
4. <u>Libya - Reaction to US Sanctions</u> . Little Change in Libyan has been noted since publicity about US sanctions occurred. Qadhafi' has been noted since publicity about US sanctions occurred. Qadhafi'	S
"reasonable" posture in Austria presumable thand world continue. No r	ew
destabilizing activities elsewhere in the third world continue.  terrorist activity directed against US officials has been noted, although terrorist activity directed against US exercise in the Gulf of	ough ,
Libya still intends militarily to oppose a penented at the unusually	low
Sidra. Libyan petroleum exports have appen down from \$13 billio	n to
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US sanctions, but general market conditions.	
5. Iran - Threats to the Gulf/Saudi Arabia. Discussions between	en Libya "
and Iran concerning military activity against Saudi Arabian petroleum facilities continue, but no indication of actual intentions to act h	as been
obtained.	1
	(ATT 25X1
agencies agree that the most likely Iranian threat across the Gulf i	s one
agencies agree that the most likely Irahian chreat deloss and of subversion, followed in order of likelihood by commando raid, air	strikes, planning
and a major operation. In summary: Iranian concern and constructions	fied; OCYA
regarding actions against the petroleum producting states has they have the capability for limited operations against various target they have the capability for limited operations.	ets, 25X1
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6. Iran-Iraq War: Mining. It appears that Iraqis have implant	ed sea25X1
mines against Iranian shipping. These are probably of a nerrcopter-	25X1
delivered, acoustic variety.	
7. Lebanon-Israel-Syria. Despite the temporary calming effections to the underlying tensions in	this
Habib mission, no long-term solutions to the underlying behaviors miss	sion,
region have been found. Israel was sharply critical and brands the ceasefire as an umbrella for PLO buildup in South Lei	oanon. 25X1
ominously there have been five terrorist attempts in Israel since means of which resulted in loss of life.	25X1
none at which resulted in loss of the	25X1 + a ratio
This force strength continues to permi invasion of south Lebanon with little further buildup. In summary,	all
agencies feel an attack remains likely, could be provoked by resulting in loss of life, and would occur with little intelligence resulting in loss of life, and would occur with little intelligence	om the
resulting in loss of life, and would occur with riche intervision warning. A consensus exists that the date of Israeli withdrawal fraction is no longer a consideration in the timing of a south Lebanon	operation.
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